Desktop client roadmap
From mnema-talk v3.3.13, rendered on this site.
Status: the desktop client is Beta. Windows and macOS run a Tauri host and Linux runs an Electron client; Windows is the furthest along. Builds come from the desktop repository (releases of this repository through v0.7.3 attached an older ZIP). The Gaming integration described below is Windows only. The installers are not signed with a platform certificate (no Authenticode, macOS ad-hoc signed); the program updates itself from releases signed with the project's own key, see doc/desktop-trusted-client.md. Published-client checks cover instance selection, login, persisted chat, live peer reception and logout. Physical media capture, real-game and fullscreen compatibility, sealed media in WebView2 and complete browser parity remain separate acceptance work.
The current client source is
experimental/app
in web-client mode, in the
talk-desktop repository.
It runs the shared Vue app from a signed bundle that the client verifies and
reaches the selected instance through its own proxy; the instance supplies data,
never executable code (doc/desktop-trusted-client.md).
Since 1.1 it shows several servers side by side, each with its own session,
browser storage and connection
(several servers at once).
The native-crypto boundary below remains a separate requirement. The older
feasibility probe
is a historical foundation.
See product status and evidence for the binding scope.
Installing the unsigned Beta
The desktop app is Beta and its installers are not code-signed: the project will not buy code-signing certificates. The operating system therefore warns before the first start. This does not mean the file is malicious, and it is no substitute for checking it: download only from the desktop releases and compare the published checksum. The app itself still verifies its web bundle and its updates with the project's own signatures.
Windows (SmartScreen). Choose More info, then Run anyway. If the file was downloaded in a browser and still refuses to start, open its Properties and tick Unblock.
macOS (Gatekeeper). Right-click the app, choose Open, then Open
again. Alternatively, after a blocked first start open System Settings,
Privacy & Security and choose Open Anyway for Mnema. As a last resort,
remove the quarantine flag: xattr -dr com.apple.quarantine "/Applications/<app name>.app".
Linux. AppImage and .deb packages need no such step; make the AppImage
executable (chmod +x) before running it.
If you cannot accept these warnings, use the browser app, which is the fully supported client.
Connecting to your server: errors and fixes
When you enter your server's address, the desktop client checks it before it
loads anything. If the check fails it shows one of these messages (the wording
is the client's). The address must be an HTTPS address such as
https://chat.example.com, without a path.
| Message (shortened) | Cause | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| Enter an HTTPS address / not a valid server address / use an HTTPS address without credentials, path or query | The address is empty, malformed or has more than scheme and host | Type only https://chat.example.com (a port is allowed) |
| The server refused the connection | Nothing listens at that address and port, or a firewall rejects it | Check the address and port; check the proxy is up and TCP 443 is forwarded |
| The server did not answer in time | Wrong address, a firewall that drops packets, or the server is down | Open the same address in a browser on that computer; check DNS and port forwarding |
| The server address could not be resolved | The name has no DNS record yet, or this computer's DNS cannot find it | Create the DNS A record; check the spelling |
| Your router may not support reaching it through its public address (NAT loopback/hairpin) | The server is in your own network and the router cannot loop traffic back | Use the server's local address, or test from another network; see the FAQ |
| This computer does not trust the server's HTTPS certificate | Wrong name, self-signed or expired certificate, a wrong computer clock, or an antivirus or network filter that intercepts HTTPS | Fix the certificate (TLS certificates), set the clock, turn off HTTPS scanning for this address |
| The server offers no TLS version this client can use | The server only speaks TLS 1.0/1.1 | Enable TLS 1.2 or 1.3 in the proxy |
| The server could not be reached over trusted HTTPS / the server is unavailable or redirects to a different address | A redirect to another host name, or a proxy error page | Use the final address, without redirects |
| The server needs an update for the desktop client / is too old (needs X or newer) / the client needs a newer app | Server and client versions are too far apart | Update the server (updating.md) or the desktop client |
If the same address works in a browser but not in the client, an antivirus or a company network filter that re-signs HTTPS traffic is the usual reason.
Windows Gaming DEV
The shared-client host now connects gaming surfaces to the actual Vue Talk state of the server that owns the Talk (with several servers open, only that one). The instance must serve the updated shared web client; an older web client without the gaming bridge cannot activate these surfaces.
- Join Talk, then focus a detected game. The passive left-hand sidepeek shows participants, speaking, mute and screen sharing. It ignores mouse input.
- Alt+M opens the interactive overlay. It offers mute, deafen, screen-share controls and push-to-talk mode. Starting a share returns to the existing capture chooser in the main client; stopping a share uses the active Talk.
- Open the overlay settings to rebind overlay, mute, deafen and push-to-talk. Defaults are Alt+M, Alt+N, Alt+D and Space. Bindings persist locally.
- Settings also include a global Gaming overlay and sidepeek switch and a background opacity slider (default 55%). Use the native Gaming menu in the main client or instance selector to open these settings even without Talk or a game, including when the overlay is disabled.
- The client recognises games from your launchers' libraries and a bundled list of about 600 games. Additional executable basenames can be configured for other games or installation variants. Existing custom names and shortcuts are preserved.
- Leaving Talk, losing the connection or moving to another application hides both surfaces. No own Talk connection means no sidepeek or voice overlay.
- Gaming PTT grants short microphone leases on the audio rendering clock. A renderer stall cannot extend the last granted lease.
This is an unsigned Windows DEV integration using ordinary topmost windows, a focus-change notification for the foreground process and Raw Input events for the configured keys (no key polling, no keyboard hook). It does not inject into games or capture a keyboard history. A matching basename is a user-selected candidate, not a trusted executable identity. Exclusive fullscreen rendering, anti-cheat compatibility and real-game behavior require testing on the target machine. Windows behavior is not a macOS/Linux gaming qualification. The web-client mode loads the instance's web app in WebView2, so voice uses the same browser path: microphone, camera and screen payloads are sealed in the page before the SFU sees them. This is not yet qualified on real Windows hardware. Chat and attachments stay readable by the server.
Windows game detection
Detection starts from the operating system's notification that the focused application changed and looks only at that one process. It is recognised, in this order, by the executable names you added, by the install folders your launchers report (Steam, Epic Games Store, GOG Galaxy and the EA app, read-only from their own manifests and registry keys; Battle.net is not read), and by a bundled list of about 600 well-known PC games. There is no game injection, background process enumeration or runtime catalog download. Paths and window titles are not sent to the instance. A matching name is a detection hint, not proof of executable identity or exclusive fullscreen support. The details are in the desktop repository's gaming reference.
The bundled list includes World of Warcraft, Genshin Impact, Star Wars: Empire at War, Payday 1–3, Act of Aggression, Wardogs, Minecraft, League of Legends, Elder Scrolls Online, Black Desert, Call of Duty and Beyond All Reason. Several titles have multiple executable variants. Java is never matched by name: Java Minecraft requires a window title containing “Minecraft”, so unrelated Java applications do not activate Gaming. Modded launchers with different titles may need further detection work.
Settings
Use the native Gaming menu in the instance selector or main desktop window, or the settings button in Alt+M. The global switch controls both the overlay and sidepeek. Their visibility still requires your own connected Talk and a foreground game. The separate settings window works without those conditions and offers no Talk controls or participant roster.
Background opacity applies to the passive sidepeek; text remains fully opaque. The interactive overlay keeps its darker background for readable controls. Additional EXE names are entered one per line (up to 32, basenames only). Settings are stored locally. A server-only update cannot add native detection or replace the bundled Gaming surfaces.
Reference sources and scope
The bundled list is maintained by hand from public knowledge of the executable names games ship: a display name, one or more executable names and, for some, a Steam app id. It is deliberately not complete and has not been checked against installed copies, which is why the launcher libraries and the names you add come first. Launcher entries and generic helper executables are excluded. A list entry does not qualify every installation variant, anti-cheat system or fullscreen mode.
Product requirements
The desktop app bundles the existing Vue/TypeScript interface locally and connects to self-hosted communities (any number side by side, each fully separate). Each community supplies API data, never executable client code. Tauri v2 is the shell on Windows and macOS. Linux uses Electron, because the WebKitGTK that Tauri uses there has no WebRTC. Changing shells does not itself solve end-to-end encryption or exclusive-fullscreen overlays.
Windows is the furthest along. macOS (Apple silicon) and Linux, including X11 and Wayland, are published as Beta; the gaming overlay is Windows only. The main app and interactive overlay must expose the complete role-appropriate web feature set. Rewriting the web app in React is not a prerequisite.
The gaming interface has two parts:
- A configurable participant widget, initially at the top left, visible only while the user is in their own active Voice channel and a game is active. It shows participants, speaking, mute/deafen and screen-sharing status. It disappears on leaving Voice, losing the game context or losing trusted media state.
- An interactive overlay opened by configurable Alt+M (Option+M on macOS), including the widget and normal app controls, such as mute and starting a share. Without an active Voice channel and game, the shortcut does nothing.
The widget must not appear on the desktop or an unrelated application. Push-to-talk and overlay bindings are configurable. Losing input monitoring, locking the session or leaving Voice releases held push-to-talk; restoring a context must not reopen the microphone automatically. Exclusive fullscreen is a required qualification case. A window covering a monitor is insufficient evidence.
Security and client boundaries
First launch requests an HTTPS instance address. Bounded discovery verifies TLS, API and client compatibility before offering credentials. Self-hosted certificate authorities use normal system trust; there is no certificate bypass. Switching instances must isolate credentials, device keys, cached data and active connections.
The desktop shells must preserve the browser's existing cookie, CSRF, Origin
and CSP protections. The desktop shells apply the strict web CSP (style-src 'self'; style-src-attr 'none')
only for web bundles >= 1.1.0; older bundles keep the old policy. Old desktop
storage from before multi-server support is wiped once and never handed to a
server. Local Tauri pages cannot reuse the browser transport by
spoofing an Origin or enabling wildcard CORS. Renderer permissions are limited to
specific commands; there is no generic filesystem, shell or arbitrary HTTP bridge.
Microphone, camera, screen sharing and system audio are sealed in the browser before the server sees them. The server forwards those payloads without decrypting them. There is no plaintext fallback for those tracks. Chat, reactions and attachments stay readable by the server and are not deleted by age. Connection and routing metadata remain visible to the server.
A shared session and media owner coordinates the main window, widget and overlay. Opening the overlay must not create a second microphone, media connection or independent cryptographic sender context. Local search, previews and attachment validation stay on the client.
Compatibility, development builds and updates
The server advertises versioned compatibility states: supported, deprecated or unsupported. API compatibility is separate from encryption capability and device trust. A discovery response alone cannot enable an encrypted session.
Administrators may either mirror official client packages or direct users to GitHub Releases. A mirror is a delivery location, not a release-signing authority. The client must independently verify package authenticity and prevent rollback or stale metadata from installing an unsafe release.
No Windows code-signing certificate exists and none will be bought (Beta; see installing the unsigned Beta). The self-update is signed separately (minisign, key pinned in the client) and installs only verified, newer versions. Development builds must be clearly identified as unsigned. Automatic installation of unverifiable updates remains disabled. Production distribution additionally requires updater signatures, platform signing requirements, complete license notices and reproducible source/package identification.
Delivery gates
| Gate | Required result |
|---|---|
| G0 — feasibility | Real target-hardware evidence for fullscreen overlay, press/release input and encrypted media in each required platform route |
| G1 — transport | Bounded discovery, explicit compatibility, isolated instances and narrow IPC |
| G2 — crypto | Reviewed provider/protocol selection, device trust, storage and recovery model |
| G3 — shared client | Locally bundled web feature parity with a single session/media owner |
| G4 — gaming | Game detection, gated participant widget, interactive overlay, rebindable shortcuts and safe input cleanup |
| G5 — encryption | All protected content paths, negative tests, membership changes, recovery and legacy-data handling |
| G6 — distribution | Verified updates, optional self-host mirrors, platform packages and licensing |
| G7 — qualification | Coverage gates, two independent code reviews, security review and actual platform/game tests |
| G8 — release | Normal reviewed release pipeline and verified NAS deployment with backup/restore evidence |
Design and isolated implementation work can proceed while hardware access is pending. A missing hardware or security gate remains open; it cannot be replaced with a successful build or a development deadline.
Historical foundation evidence and limits
The following describes the earlier probe and native foundations, not the released web-client mode. Current runtime evidence is listed in product status.
The probe includes HTTPS-only discovery and foreground-only Windows executable inspection. Only explicitly selected executable basenames are returned; full paths, window titles and unrelated process lists are not transmitted. Portable policy tests exercise Voice/media/game/input/lock gating. The UI distinguishes API presence from actual capture or encryption support.
The portable game-window owner binds focus operations to its native owner, session, Voice and window generations. Stale operations and loss of context clear views and release push-to-talk. This policy does not create overlay windows or prove that OS events, game-window lifetime and media shutdown are wired correctly.
Windows CI builds and packages the unsigned executable with dependency notices. Its checksum receipt identifies development artifact bytes and packaging inputs; it is not a publisher signature, updater authorization or runtime test result.
A Windows CI build can establish compilation and unit-test results. It does not establish game compatibility, anti-cheat acceptance, input delivery or exclusive fullscreen operation. Tests must record OS, hardware, drivers, game/rendering mode, display configuration and measured results. Process injection or anti-cheat circumvention is not an approved shortcut.
See the probe instructions for the current build and testing scope, and SECURITY.md for the released server security model.